The Glory of God and The Expanding Power of the State Part 2
The Expansion of the Power of the State
This time I want to mention two characters of the state that contribute to its expanding power. Of course, there are many other factors that can be considered, but I just want to focus on two of them.
The Paternal Character of the State
In Schlossberg’s chapter on Idols of Power, there is a section where he explains this character. Under his discussion on Our Father the State, Schlossberg quoted an incident taken from the first century when Diocletian published his Edict of 301 justifying his actions of destroying civil liberties by identifying himself and his allies as “watchful parents” (p. 183). Such an image is very attractive to the public, and they willingly embrace it. And so, the public is looking up to the state for sustenance or as the source of physical provision, which can rightly be expected only from natural parents. Whenever people behave that way, for Schlossberg, such an act is “cultic” and idolatrous (ibid.). This to him is the beginning of the transformation of “the state from being a gift of God, given to protect us against violence, into an idol” (p. 184).
And then Schlossberg further describes the paternal character of civil government as that of a bad parent who wants his children to remain dependent on him forever (ibid.). This is because the civil government “thrives on dependency," and whenever such a dependency is broken, the state loses its power. Schlossberg depicts the nature of the relationship between the state and the dependents as "parasitic," where both are marching towards their own destruction (ibid.).
Schlossberg believes that the state’s primary task is to serve justice. Nevertheless, when this task has been replaced with the provision of paternal security, the state will then cease to fulfill its primary task of providing justice (ibid.).
Turning to Ludwig von Mises, he came up with such an assessment earlier than Schlossberg. In the sixth chapter of his book, Bureaucracy, the dominance of the idea of a paternal government is the third psychological outcome of bureaucratization, where bureaucratization, by the way, is the most effective tool of the advocates of government omnipotence to advance the power of the state.
Mises traces this idea of paternal government from Plato’s philosophy, which serves as the foundation for the concept of an ideal state and which was later applied by the Roman Catholic Church "under the Tridentine organization as it emerged from the Counter-Reformation" (p. 101) and described as a model of “perfect bureaucracy” (p. 102). Such a model has been followed by socialist intellectuals like Count Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte in their creation of future utopias.
The Messianic Character of the State
I remember last 11 October during our chapel service, Dr. Laurence B. Gatawa preached from Acts 9:19-22 and argued that the divinity and Messianic character of Christ cannot be separated. Such proclamation of the gospel during the first century was so powerful in the context of imperial claims to such attributes. In today’s context, though no civil government would be bold enough to ascribe divinity to itself, there is literature that argues for such. And not only that, civil governments of today act as if they are the saviors of the people.
For Schlossberg, this messianic character is evident in the claims of the state about “ownership of all things, the right to formulate laws without any reference to transcendent moral standards (pp. 205ff) and as a consequence reduces other authorities like the local magistrates (pp. 212ff) and the family (pp. 215ff) to impotence. For Schlossberg, the only way out is a renewed faith in the sovereignty of God, which alone justifies resistance to totalitarianism (pp. 228ff).
Philosophically, Hegel, an observer of the French Revolution, contributed a lot to the justification of a centralized state. He gave the state an aura of divinity. And with such a divine attribute, a messianic character has been attached. Political action, therefore, now is the way to salvation. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that even in matters of theological and spiritual problems, politics is the way to go for Schlossberg himself asserts that “In the hands of theologians of political redemption the state is an idol” (p. 179).
Schlossberg was prophetic in saying that this messianic character of the state is most evident in times of crisis. The word “survival” provides the strongest justification for the imposition of state power. People are susceptible to giving up their freedom just to attain such a goal.
Since ancient history, “Deifying rulers has always been a means of legitimizing their rule” (p. 185). That’s what we learn from imperial cult worship during the New Testament times. The intention was “to solidify the hold of the emperors and establish their legitimacy” (ibid.). This idol state “uses the language of compassion because its intention is a messianic one” (ibid.). Schlossberg agrees with Jacques Ellul that with the popularity of such a mindset, we have now entered into what the latter called “the new soteriology” (p. 186).
Schlossberg then identified two other periods in history where such a messianic character of the state became common. For him, it “resembles the millennial movements that were common in the Middle Ages” and the transformation of this messianic ethos into something revolutionary in the 18th century by “seeking salvation in the complete overthrow of society” (ibid.).
Returning to the United States, this messianic character of the state is visible in federal tax policy. For Schlossberg, this “illustrates the government’s unconscious rush to be the god of its citizens” (p. 187). He then further explains the nature of this new soteriology:
When a provision in the tax laws permits the taxpayer to keep a portion of his money, the Internal Revenue Service calls this a ‘tax expenditure,’ or an ‘implicit government grant.’ This is not tax money that the state has collected and expended but the money it has allowed the citizen to keep by not taking it. In other words, any money the citizen is permitted to keep is regarded as if the state has graciously given it to him. Everything we have is from the state, to which we owe gratitude. In fact, we are property of the state, which therefore has the right to the fruit of our labor (ibid.).
The Expanding Power of the State
Both the paternal and the messianic character of the state contributed greatly to the expanding power of civil government.
In the fifth chapter of his book, Schlossberg introduced the idols of power by giving us a brief history of the creation of Leviathan. He began his story in the age of feudalism. During that period, the medieval monarch allied with “the rising middle class” to attack their common enemy, the nobility. The middle class, who were emancipated from serfdom, recreated prosperity in the 11th century, and with the emergence of towns and commerce, signaled a new era. Such an alliance is best exemplified in late 17th-century France. A century later, the middle class became very influential. Such a triumph requires eight centuries to materialize. And then the French Revolution of 1789 added a flavor of nationalism. At that time, those who fought for France were considered “patriots rendering due obeisance to a deity” (p. 178). Such is their “sacred duty” that, according to Schlossberg, such language “has remained part of the liturgy of patriotism to the present, even in officially atheistic countries like the Soviet Union” (ibid.).
As already mentioned earlier, Hegel, an observer of the French Revolution, played a significant role in the development of an aura of divinity given to the centralized state as well as its messianic character. Hence, statism has experienced exponential growth since then.
For Schlossberg, despite the irrationality and dangers of statism, people are convinced that to do otherwise, society will be chaotic. Even in the face of solid economic analysis, a central government ignoring the price system and replacing it with the planner’s will is actually operating blind and wasting economic resources. Both “Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises each arrived at this conclusion independently and discussed it together shortly before Weber’s death” (pp. 227-228).
In all of this, human freedom is the primary casualty. In Christianity, we understand freedom as grounded “from the separation of the creation and the Creator... from the limitations on Caesar, the declaration that he is a creature, and the removal of the divine status that he continually seeks to acquire” (p. 228). I think we agree with Schlossberg that “Christian liberty rests on the foundation that man’s responsibility to God may not be abridged or compromised by lesser loyalties." This is the conviction that made it possible for Peter to say that he would obey God rather than man and thus relativizes all human powers. When loyalty to God disappears, there is no longer a barrier to an omnipotent state" (pp. 228-229).
Quoting Daniel Bell, Schlossberg wrote, “the central question before us is whether, with society’s repudiation of Christian faith, culture can provide sufficient cohesion to prevent disintegration” (p. 229). The “answer is that the state takes the place of the discarded religious tradition,” and then this time referencing Ellul, this can only happen if the state will be “transformed into a cultic object” (ibid.). For Ellul, “‘It is not the state which enslaves us, not even a centralized police state. It is its sacral transfiguration . . .’” (ibid.).
Schlossberg claims that “The Enlightenment prepared the way for one manifestation of this worship, that which was directed toward the nation with its appurtenances of flag, army, anthem, and national glory” (ibid.). And then he continued that “It is those pretensions of divinity, whether conscious or not, that make the expansion of state power pernicious” (p. 230). Near the end of the chapter, Schlossberg summarizes his arguments by saying, “For now the state is not only a means for the accumulation of power and wealth but also a means of salvation, the messianic hope, the deliverer of mankind” (p. 231).
Returning to Ludwig von Mises’ Omnipotent Government, he identifies “two distinctive trends” in “the history of the last two hundred years,” which he describes as “the trend toward freedom, the rights of man, and self-determination” and “the trend toward state omnipotence” (p. 8). The first trend “resulted in the fall of autocratic government, the establishment of democracy, the evolution of capitalism, technical improvements, and an unprecedented rise in standards of living” (ibid.). Furthermore, “it substituted enlightenment for old superstitions and scientific methods of research for inveterate prejudices. It was an epoch of great artistic and literary achievements, the age of immortal musicians, painters, writers, and philosophers. And it brushed away slavery, serfdom, torture, inquisition, and other remnants of the dark ages” (ibid.).
In the second trend, men now seem eager to vest all powers in governments, i.e., in the apparatus of social compulsion and coercion. They aim at totalitarianism, that is, conditions in which all human affairs are managed by governments. They hail every step toward more government interference as progress toward a more perfect world; they are confident that the governments will transform the earth into a paradise” (ibid.).
In Bureaucracy, Mises shows how the advocates of government omnipotence utilized the bureaucratic system to advance the power of the state. Mises started his argument by narrating first that "The history of government bureaucratism is very old" and "It characterizes the governments of ancient Egypt and imperial China" (p. 15). In fact, the rise of modern government bureaucratism out of the ruins of feudalism was simply an attempt on the part of the state to substitute "the supremacy of a multitude of petty princes and counts" with bureaucratic management (ibid.). In Europe, France was the most successful in achieving this goal, the goal of abolishing "the autonomy of powerful vassals and of oligarchic groups of aristocrats" (ibid.). The process culminated during the French Revolution, where "the arbitrariness of the kings" was eliminated and "made the law supreme in the field of administration and restricted the scope of affairs subject to the discretionary judgment of the officeholders" (pp. 15-16). The victory of the law did not wipe out the bureaucratic system. Instead, it has been transformed and is now clothed with a "legal and constitutional basis" (p. 16).
In the place of kings' arbitrariness, a new form of arbitrariness emerged. The administrative system of France in the 19th century was an example of how the law was used to subdue "the arbitrariness of the bureaucrats" (ibid.). France served as a model for other nations to follow. Prussia followed in the footstep of France. In the case of Great Britain and the United States, there was much confidence that they were following a different path. They think that their concept of the "rule of law" safeguarded them from the arbitrariness of the bureaucrats. However, Mises indicated that both the British and the Americans were mistaken for their experience and showed "that no legal precautions are strong enough to resist a trend supported by a powerful ideology" (ibid.). Interventionist ideas and "socialism have undermined the dams erected by twenty generations of Anglo-Saxons against the flood of arbitrary rule" (ibid.).