Bitcoin Thursday — Core Vulnerabilities, Lightning Fixes and Testnet5

Bitcoin Thursday — November 19, 2026

Bitcoin Core security disclosures, Lightning fund-safety fixes, hardware-wallet research and the launch of a new Bitcoin test network.

Welcome back to Bitcoin Thursday, my weekly overview of important developments around Bitcoin, node software, the Lightning Network and security.

This edition covers information published or confirmed since November 12. Older vulnerabilities are identified by their original discovery and repair dates so that a new disclosure is not confused with a new attack.


TL;DR

  • Three vulnerabilities affecting older Bitcoin Core releases have been publicly disclosed.
  • LDK 0.2.8 and 0.1.14 fix vulnerabilities that could cause denial of service, fee overpayments or loss of funds.
  • Malicious JavaScript reached Ledger’s website through a compromised third-party experimentation service, but Ledger says its devices and private keys were not compromised.
  • Testnet5’s genesis block was mined on November 14.
  • New draft BIPs propose protection against malicious hardware wallets leaking seeds through signatures.
  • Core Lightning fixed a peer-triggered crash involving an impossible HTLC amount of approximately 92 million BTC.
  • Rune-minting transaction chains were identified as the cause of degraded compact-block reconstruction.

1. Bitcoin Core discloses three previously fixed vulnerabilities

Status: Confirmed disclosures — November 12, 2026

Bitcoin Core developer Antoine Poinsot published three security advisories covering vulnerabilities fixed in Bitcoin Core 29.2 and 30.0.

The affected release branches have now reached end of life. These are newly published details about older, already corrected vulnerabilities—not evidence that currently maintained Bitcoin Core releases were compromised this week.

Mining template creation could stop after a reorganization

The highest-severity issue affected Bitcoin Core versions 28.0 through 29.1 when used for mining.

During certain blockchain reorganizations, TRUC sibling eviction could remove a transaction from the mempool while leaving its descendants behind. This inconsistent state prevented the affected node from creating new block templates until it was restarted.

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by Niklas Gögge in September 2025 and fixed by Greg Sanders.

Who was affected: Nodes creating mining templates. Ordinary non-mining nodes were not affected by this particular failure mode.

Source: Bitcoin Core advisory: block-template creation halted during a reorganization

Inbound Tor peers could receive excessive permissions

A configuration bug could give every inbound Tor peer the permissions associated with Bitcoin Core’s -whitelist option.

This occurred when the whitelisted network range included the address of the local Tor daemon—a configuration reportedly used by thousands of reachable nodes.

Whitelisted peers are exempt from several denial-of-service limits and privacy protections. Treating arbitrary Tor peers as trusted could therefore increase resource-exhaustion risks and expose additional transaction-relay information.

The issue was responsibly disclosed by Martin Zumsande and Antoine Poinsot in September 2025 and fixed by Zumsande.

Source: Bitcoin Core advisory: inbound Tor connections received whitelist permissions

A compact-block peer could delay block processing

A peer that was first to announce a compact block could exploit witness malleability to delay processing of that block for up to ten minutes.

Under some conditions, the attacker could repeat the delay indefinitely.

The vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by Eugene Siegel in April 2025 and fixed by Greg Sanders.

Source: Bitcoin Core advisory: compact-block processing stall

Fixes for the first two vulnerabilities were also included in Bitcoin Core 28.3.

Why it matters: Anyone still running an end-of-life Bitcoin Core series should upgrade to a maintained version. Operators using managed systems such as Umbrel should use the platform’s supported update rather than manually replacing its bitcoind binary.

Additional source: Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431


2. LDK security releases fix potential losses and denial-of-service attacks

Status: Confirmed releases — November 10, 2026

Lightning Development Kit published LDK 0.2.8 and LDK 0.1.14.

Both releases fix vulnerabilities that could result in loss of funds or denial of service. They also repair problems involving route hints and cooperative channel closes.

Version 0.2.8 includes additional fixes for:

  • Excessive fees when paying static BOLT12 invoices
  • Denial-of-service attacks against LSPS2 liquidity services
  • Incorrect cooperative-close signature handling

Two cooperative-close bugs could cause LDK to combine signatures intended for different closing transactions.

In one case, LDK could reuse a cached signature simply because a new closing transaction proposed the same fee. In another, a peer could disconnect while an asynchronous signer was unavailable, leaving old signing state to be combined with a new proposal after reconnection.

LDK could then attempt to broadcast an invalid closing transaction while internally treating the channel as closed. Funds could remain stranded and require recovery.

Why it matters: LDK is a development library rather than a normal node application. Most users receive the fix when the wallet, Lightning service or application containing LDK publishes an update. Application developers should determine which LDK branch they use and update accordingly.

The release notes describe exploitable vulnerabilities, but they do not report a confirmed widespread theft caused by these bugs.

Sources: LDK 0.2.8 release · LDK 0.1.14 release · Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431


3. Supply-chain attack serves malicious code through Ledger’s website

Status: Confirmed incident — November 16, 2026

An unauthorized party exploited a flaw in the account-signup process of Optimizely Web Experimentation, a third-party service used by many major websites.

The attacker impersonated users on selected customer accounts and inserted malicious JavaScript into their website experiments.

Optimizely says it detected the incident on November 16, blocked delivery of the malicious code and closed the vulnerability within three hours. It later removed the injected code from affected projects and revoked access belonging to the impersonated users.

Fewer than 5% of Optimizely’s Web Experimentation customers were affected, according to the company.

One affected customer was hardware-wallet manufacturer Ledger. Ledger confirmed that malicious code had been served through its website and that the issue was subsequently remediated.

Ledger says:

  • The incident did not compromise the security architecture of its devices.
  • Private keys stored by Ledger devices remained protected.
  • The malicious code is no longer being served through its website.

Independent analysis of the wider Optimizely attack found code capable of replacing cryptocurrency addresses shown on websites or copied to the clipboard. Other payloads attempted to collect payment-card data, cookies and screenshots.

There is currently no confirmed report in the reviewed sources that the Ledger hardware itself was breached or that Ledger users lost bitcoin through this incident.

What users should remember: A hardware wallet protects private keys, but it cannot automatically determine whether a destination address shown by a compromised computer or website belongs to the intended recipient. Always verify the complete destination address on the trusted hardware-wallet screen before approving a transaction.

Sources: Optimizely’s official incident history · Optimizely incident report · Ledger’s incident statement


4. Draft BIPs aim to stop malicious hardware wallets leaking seeds

Status: Research and draft specifications — not yet audited

Developer Connor Avila has proposed two draft BIPs for exfiltration-resistant signing.

A compromised hardware wallet may be able to leak information about its seed by manipulating the nonce it uses when creating ECDSA or Schnorr signatures. The resulting signatures can remain completely valid, making the leak difficult for the user or wallet software to notice.

The proposed protocol allows the host computer to contribute randomness to nonce generation. The signing device must then prove that it used the host’s contribution.

The first draft specifies a two-round anti-exfiltration protocol for ECDSA and Schnorr signatures. The second adds three per-input fields to PSBTs so wallets and signing devices can exchange the required commitments and randomness.

The proposal includes:

  • Test vectors
  • A Python reference implementation
  • A C module for libsecp256k1
  • PSBT fields for coordinating the signing process

Related ideas have been discussed by Stepan Snigirev, Pieter Wuille, Moonsettler and Sjors Provoost. The recently merged BIP461 provides a separate mechanism for identifying possible attempts by a signer to leak key information.

Avila explicitly requested cryptographic review because the new proposal has not yet received an audit.

Why it matters: Hardware wallets reduce exposure to malware on the host computer, but users must still trust the device’s firmware. Anti-exfiltration signing attempts to reduce the damage a malicious signer could cause without making its signatures invalid.

This is a proposal, not a feature that users should assume their hardware wallet already supports.

Sources: Connor Avila’s Bitcoin-Dev announcement · Draft anti-exfiltration signing BIP · Draft PSBT extension · Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431


5. Core Lightning rejects an impossible 92-million-BTC HTLC

Status: Confirmed code fix

Core Lightning fixed a peer-triggered crash involving an oversized HTLC amount.

A malicious channel peer could propose an HTLC worth approximately 92 million BTC by setting the highest bit in the amount field. During a signed balance calculation, that value could be interpreted as negative and bypass the normal insufficient-balance check.

Core Lightning would later attempt to construct a commitment transaction containing the impossible payment. An internal assertion would fail and terminate the affected channel’s channeld subprocess.

Core Lightning now rejects amounts above Lightning’s protocol ceiling of 21 million BTC, expressed in millisatoshis, before performing the signed balance calculation.

Why it matters: The attacker could not create 92 million real bitcoin or extract that amount from a channel. The bug was an input-validation and availability problem: a deliberately absurd amount could crash the process managing the attacker’s channel.

Sources: Core Lightning pull request #9610 · Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431


Bitcoin Thursday meme

Peer: “Please forward 92 million BTC.”
Node: “Bitcoin only made 21 million.”


6. Testnet5 is now live

Status: Confirmed launch — genesis block mined November 14, 2026

The genesis block of Bitcoin Testnet5 was mined on November 14 at 05:03 UTC.

The new network is specified by BIP95 and is intended to replace Testnet4, which suffered from repeated reorganizations related to its special minimum-difficulty rule.

Testnet5:

  • Removes Testnet4’s 20-minute minimum-difficulty exception
  • Uses a minimum difficulty of approximately one million
  • Enforces the proposed BIP54 consensus-cleanup rules from its first block
  • Uses a genesis block committing to Bitcoin mainnet block 975,744
  • Has a separate genesis block and UTXO set from earlier test networks

The mainnet block commitment demonstrates that Testnet5 was not secretly pre-mined before the announced launch.

The network’s genesis block was mined publicly following a plan announced by Anthony Towns. The BIP95 authors are Pol Espinasa and Fabian Jahr.

Testnet5 support still needs to appear in released node and wallet software before the network becomes convenient for general testing.

Most importantly, enabling BIP54 on Testnet5 does not activate BIP54 on Bitcoin mainnet. Mainnet has no announced activation date or mechanism for the consensus-cleanup proposal.

Why it matters: Developers, miners and pools gain a public environment for testing consensus-cleanup rules and mining software with coins that have no intended monetary value.

Sources: BIP95: Testnet5 specification and genesis parameters · Anthony Towns’ launch announcement · Bitcoin Core Testnet5 implementation


7. Rune-minting chains disrupted compact-block reconstruction

Status: Confirmed investigation — not a consensus failure

Researcher 0xB10C investigated why compact-block relay performed unusually poorly between mid-July and mid-October.

His nodes could reconstruct only about 1% to 5% of blocks without requesting additional transaction data. They sometimes needed approximately 100 kB of extra data per block.

Gregory Sanders found that most missing transactions belonged to long chains of rune mints that reached mining pools before they reached ordinary public nodes.

The transactions were approximately 100 vbytes each and used pay-to-anchor inputs and outputs. Other transactions spent anchors from the middle of those chains, replacing the remaining descendants in mempools that accepted the replacement.

Different nodes received the chains and replacements in different orders. Their mempools therefore diverged from each other and from the transactions eventually selected by mining pools.

Compact blocks assume that the receiving node already has most of the block’s transactions in its mempool. When this assumption failed, nodes had to request more transaction data.

Why it matters: Blocks continued to validate normally. The problem increased relay bandwidth and reduced the efficiency of compact-block reconstruction; it did not break Bitcoin’s consensus rules.

Sources: 0xB10C’s compact-block reconstruction analysis · Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431


Confirmed facts versus proposals

The Bitcoin Core disclosures, LDK releases, Core Lightning fix, Optimizely incident and Testnet5 genesis block are confirmed.

The hardware-wallet anti-exfiltration specifications remain unaudited draft proposals.

The Optimizely compromise demonstrably served malicious JavaScript through affected websites, including Ledger’s site. However, the reviewed sources do not establish that Ledger devices or their private-key storage were compromised, nor do they confirm bitcoin losses by Ledger users.

Testnet5 is a separate test network. Its use of BIP54 does not activate those rules on Bitcoin mainnet.


This week’s takeaway

Security boundaries extend beyond Bitcoin’s consensus rules.

A node depends on networking code, Tor configuration and Lightning implementations. A hardware wallet depends on the user verifying transaction details on its trusted display. Even an official website can serve hostile code when a third-party script supplier is compromised.

The practical lessons are straightforward:

  • Run maintained Bitcoin and Lightning software.
  • Update applications that embed LDK.
  • Verify complete payment addresses on your hardware wallet.
  • Treat development proposals and test-network activations separately from mainnet changes.

Which development matters most to you this week: the Bitcoin Core disclosures, hardware-wallet anti-exfiltration, or the launch of Testnet5?


Bitcoin Thursday is an independent weekly overview of Bitcoin development and security. It is not financial advice. Verify releases and signatures through official project channels before updating critical infrastructure.

There is no order without chaos!

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